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BANKRUPTCY-SECTION 70c-RECENT REACTIONS TO Constance 
v. Harvey-The second sentence of section 70c of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act, as amended through 1952, reads as follows: 
"The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming 
into possession or control of the court, upon which a creditor 
of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equi-
table proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed 
vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers 
of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, 
whether or not such a creditor actually exists."1 
This provision specifies one of the many powers of avoidance 
that the bankruptcy act gives to the trustee in bankruptcy.2 Re-
166 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. (1952) §llOc. 
2 Other sections granting powers of avoidance to the trustee are §§60b, 67d, and 70e(l). 
1'228 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW . [Vol. 57 
newed interest in section 70c has developed recently, primarily 
because of several significant decisions in the federal courts. It 
is the purpose of this comment to consider the impact of these 
developments on the power of the trustee to avoid otherwise valid 
security devices. 
I. Introduction-Constance v. Haruey 
The main thrust of section 70c is to vest the trustee with the 
rights of a hypothetical lien creditor as determined by reference 
to applicable state law. The crucial interpretative question under 
the provision is: at what time do the trustee's rights accrue? The 
statute expressly states that the trustee's rights as a lien creditor 
arise at the date of bankruptcy. But it has been suggested that 
the interpretative difficulties arise because the section "does not 
specify when credit is to be deemed to have been extended to the 
debtor for purposes of the hypothetical lien."3 
Constance v. Haruey4 is the most important case to give an an-
swer to the question when the trustee shall be deemed to have be-
come a creditor under section 70c. In this case the bankrupt, 
some two years prior to the date of bankruptcy, executed a 
purchase money chattel mortgage to appellant Constance. Con-
stance delayed ten months in recording the mortgage, a delay 
clearly unreasonable under the applicable New York law. In the 
bankruptcy proceedings, the referee and the district court sus-
tained the trustee's avoidance of Constance's chattel mortgage 
lien. On the first hearing the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed because there was no showing that an actual 
creditor extended credit to the bankrupt during the interval be-
tween the execution of the chattel mortgage and its belated re-
cording. 5 On rehearing, however, the court sustained the referee, 
reasoning that the status of the trustee under section 70c is not 
dependent on the existence of actual creditors. The court then 
went on to say that as an "ideal" hypothetical creditor,6 the trus-
3 Editor's comment at 125 following Kleinberg and M~sterson, "Constance v. Harvey 
-A Defense," 62 COMM. L.J. 124 (1957). 
4 (2d Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 571, cert. den. 348 U.S. 913 (1955). 
5 At the time of the first hearing the court may have been applying the rule of 
§70e(l) in which the trustee's rights are expressly dependent on the existence of an actual 
creditor. 
6 The "ideal" phraseology was used previously by the Second Circuit in the case of 
Hoffman v. Cream-0-Products, (2d Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 649 at 650. 
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tee can pretend to be a creditor who extended credit at whatever 
time is most advantageous to him. The court apparently felt 
that under section 70c the trustee's rights as a general, as dis-
tinguished from a lien, creditor may at the trustee's discretion 
accrue at any time under applicable state law, and such rights are 
not tied to the date of bankruptcy. The court then noted that 
under applicable New York law a chattel mortgage not recorded 
within a reasonable time can be avoided by any general creditor 
who has extended credit in the interim, i.e., the period between 
the date of the mortgage's execution and the date of its belated 
recording.7 Combining New York law and its own interpretation 
of the trustee's rights under section 70c, the court took the final 
step and held that the trustee, by asserting the rights of an "ideal" 
hypothetical creditor who had extended credit during the interim 
and who could have obtained a lien at the date of bankruptcy, 
could avoid the Constance mortgage. The court expressly stated 
that its decision was reached even though there was no proof that 
any actual credit had been extended during the interim. 
Criticism of Constance v. Harvey has been severe.8 The most 
fundamental criticism has been that it fails to preserve the proper 
balance between the . bankruptcy act's two competing policies: 
equality of distribution and preservation of fairly acquired secur-
ity interests.9 It has been argued that the Constance holding affords 
needless protection to non-existent creditors at the expense of 
chattel mortgagees who are slow to record.10 It is clear that there 
is an alternative to the Constance interpretation of section 70c. 
One writer has suggested the proper interpretation to be that the 
trustee should be regarded as a "creditor without notice who 
levied legal or equitable process at the time of bankruptcy and 
7!{arst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893). When used in this comment the 
word "interim" means the period between the execution date of the security transaction 
in question and the date of its recording. 
SSee 4 MooRE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §70.48, pp. 92-93 (Supp. 1958); 
Weintraub, Levin, and Beldock, "The Strong-Arm Clause Strikes the Belated Chattel 
Mortgage,'' 25 FoRD L. R.Ev. 261 (1956); Marsh, "Constance v. Harvey-The 'Strong-Arm 
Clause' Re-Evaluated,'' 43 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 65 (1955). But see Kleinberg and Masterson, 
"Constance v. Harvey-A Defense,'' 62 COMM. L.J. 124 (1957). 
9Marsh, "Constance v. Harvey-The 'Strong-Arm Clause' Re-Evaluated," 43 CALIF. 
L. R.Ev. 65 at 73-75 (1955). 
10 A secondary criticism of the Constance rationale is that it renders nugatory §70e(l), 
which vests in the trustee ·the rights of any actual creditor with a provable claim against 
the bankrupt at the date of bankruptcy. See Marsh, "Constance v. Harvey-The 'Strong-
Arm Clause' Re-Evaluated," 43 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 65 at 73-75 (1955). 
1230 MrcmGAN LAw R.Evmw [Vol. 57 
who also extended credit at the time of bankruptcy."11 This in-
terpretation is supported by other secondary authority, and pre-
sents the most consistent and valid specific objection to the Con-
stance interpretation. In addition, this interpretation has been in-
corporated into a proposed congressional amendment of sec-
tion 70c.12 
In light of this background it becomes desirable to consider 
some of the recent state and federal reactions to the Constance 
doctrine. 
IL State Legislative Reaction to Constance v. Harvey 
Analysis of state legislative reaction to the Constance case will 
be limited mainly to chattel mortgage recording statutes.13 Under 
most chattel mortgage recording statutes no Constance problem 
can arise because these statutes are designed to protect only lien 
creditors. Under such statutes no creditor can avoid a chattel 
mortgage unless he has acquired a lien on the property of the 
mortgagor prior to the recording date of the chattel mortgage. If 
the date of bankruptcy is after the recording date of the mortgage, 
the trustee cannot avoid the mortgage under section 70c. The 
trustee gains nothing by using the Constance doctrine because 
under the applicable state law a creditor cannot avoid- the chattel 
mortgage unless he acquires a lien before the mortgage has been 
recorded. By the express wording of section 70c, however, the 
trustee's status as a lien creditor accrues only at the date of bank-
ruptcy which, by hypothesis, is after the recording of the mortgage. 
Thus only chattel mortgage recording statutes designed to pro-
tect general creditors from unrecorded mortgages can be involved 
in a Constance situation.14 While such statutes all have the com-
mon design of protecting the general creditor, they differ as to 
the time within which a chattel mortgagee must record in order 
to protect his security from general creditors who actually ex-
11 Marsh, "Constance v. Harvey-The 'Strong-Arm Clause' Re-Evaluated," 43 CALIF. 
L, R.Ev. 65 at 74 {1955). 
12 H.R. 4158, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959). The amendment was favorably regarded by 
the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives at a hearing on March 5, 1959. 
13 A similar analysis could be made of state statutes regulating other types of security 
transactions, but for ease of presentation the analysis of this comment is limited to 
statutes regulating the chattel mortgage transaction. 
14 An example of such a statute is the New York act involved in the Constance case 
itself. 32 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) §230. 
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tended credit in the interim between the execution and recording 
of the mortgage.15 
Before 1952 and the emergence of section 70c in its present 
form, eleven states had chattel mortgage recording statutes capable 
of giving rise to a Constance problem.16 In only one of these states, 
Michigan, has there been legislative reaction which was clearly 
prompted by a desire to avoid the effect of Constance v. Harvey.17 
Prior to 1956, the Michigan statute18 as judicially construed re-
quired a chattel mortgage to be recorded "immediately" after its 
date of execution. If the mortgage was not recorded immediately 
-i.e., simultaneously with its execution-any general creditor who 
actually extended credit during the interim could avoid the mort-
gage. The Constance rationale works a particularly harsh result 
under such a statute. The slightest delay in recording by the chat-
tel mortgagee permits the trustee to avoid the mortgage by apply-
ing the Constance interpretation of section 70c; the trustee merely 
pretends to be a hypothetical creditor who has extended credit 
during the period of delay in recording. That the mortgage may 
have been recorded several years prior to the date of bankruptcy 
does not defeat the trustee under section 70c when the Constance 
interpretation is applied. 
In 1956 the Michigan legislature amended the state's chattel 
mortgage recording statute. The amendment, Act 153, effective 
through the first nine months of 1957, attached to the previous 
statute a proviso that no chattel mortgage, if recorded within 14 
15 Some "Constance" statutes, as in New York and Missouri, fix the interim period 
if the chattel mortgage is not recorded "within a reasonable time." Other "Constance" 
statutes, as in California, fix the interim period if the chattel mortgage is not recorded 
"immediately" after its execution. Thus, the latter type of statute protects any general 
creditor who has extended credit during the interim, no matter how short the delay in 
the recording of the mortgage. 
16 The eleven states were Alabama, Ala. Code (1940) tit. 47, §123; California, Cal. Civ. 
Code Ann. (Deering, 1949) §2957; Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.140; Missis-
sippi, Miss. Code Ann. (1942; Rec. 1956) §§868-869; Missouri, IMo. Rev. Stat. (1949) 
§443.460; New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. (1940) §§46: 28-5 and 46: 28-10; New York, 32 N.Y. 
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) §230; South Carolina, S.C. Code (1952) §60-101; South 
Dakota, S.D. Code (1939) §39.0408; Utah, Utah Code Ann. (1953) §9-1-1; Wyoming, Wyo. 
Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §59-105. 
17 The New Jersey statute was amended in 1953. The immediate recording required 
by the statute is now defined as any recording within five days from the execution date 
of the chattel :mortgage. One of the amendment's effects is to protect any mortgage, 
recorded within the five-day period, from avoidance by the trustee's use of the Constance 
interpretation of §70c. There is no indication to what extent a desire to avoid the effect 
of Constance v. Harvey prompted the 1953 New Jersey amendment. 
18 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.140. The pre-1956 statute is construed in General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Coller, (6th Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 584. 
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days after its execution, shall be void as against creditors of the 
mortgagor in "insolvency proceedings."19 In the case of In re 
Perry,20 a federal district court held that the term "insolvency 
proceedings" as used in Act 153 included federal bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. However, the question whether Act 153 as construed was 
an invalid encroachment on an area pre-empted by the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act was not considered in the Perry case. This ques-
tion arose in the recent case of In the Matter of Freedman.21 The 
facts of this case presented a typical Constance v. Harvey situation, 
and the court assumed without deciding that the Constance case 
was good law. The court held that in the absence of Act 153 the 
trustee, under the Constance interpretation of section 70c, could 
have avoided the chattel mortgage in question. But, the court also 
held that Act 153 eliminated in insolvency proceedings the right 
of an interim creditor, and therefore the right of the hypothetical 
interim creditor under section 70c, to avoid a chattel mortgage 
recorded within 14 days from its execution date. The court upheld 
the validity of Act 153 against the trustee's assertion that it con-
flicted with section 70c of the bankruptcy act. This decision was 
based on the familiar doctrine that Congress intended that the 
powers it granted to the trustee under section 70c were to be de-
termined by reference to applicable state law including, in the 
court's opinion, Act 153 which determined the rights of interim 
creditors in insolvency proceedings. It was felt that Act 153 was 
not directed solely at bankruptcy proceedings because it also regu-
lated the rights of creditors in state insolvency proceedings. 
Although the result of the court's decision is to avoid the harsh 
effects of the Constance construction of section 70c, the reasoning 
in upholding Act 153 as construed in the Perry case appears to 
be questionable. It seems established that the federal bankruptcy 
act has "suspended" the operation of state insolvency statutes and 
permits collateral attack upon all subsequent proceedings taken 
under those laws.22 Thus the area in which state law may regulate 
the relations between an embarrassed debtor and his creditors is 
restricted mainly to statutory regulation of proceedings available 
19 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.140 as amended by Act 153, Mich. Public Acts, 
1956. The express wording of the amendment is: "Provided, however, that any such 
[chattel] mortgage shall not be void in the case of insolvency proceedings as against the 
creditors of the mortgagor if filed within 14 days from the date thereof ..•• " 
20 (S.D. Mich. 1958) 157 F. Supp. 910. 
21 (S.D. Mich. 1959) 168 F. Supp. 25. 
22 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929). 
1959] COMMENTS 1233 
at common law, such as compos1t1on and general assignment.23 
Act 153 appears, therefore, to be a patent attempt by a state legis-
lature to regulate the rights of creditors in federal bankruptcy 
proceedings; as indicated in the Perry case the phrase "insolvency 
proceedings" can reasonably have no other reference than to bank-
ruptcy proceedings.24 
Even if it is conceded that Act 153 was intended to regulate 
the rights of creditors in such state proceedings as composition 
and general assignment, the act should be invalid so long as it is 
construed to apply to bankruptcy proceedings as well. It matters 
not whether Act 153 is directed solely at bankruptcy proceedings 
or is so directed in combination with an intent to regulate the 
rights of creditors in certain state proceedings. In either case the 
act represents an encroachment on the power of Congress to regu-
late the rights of the trustee under section 70c that is forbidden by 
the supremacy clause of the Constitution.25 If construed to apply 
only to state proceedings, Act 153 would raise no federal question; 
nor would the act, so construed, affect the trustee's rights as a hy-
pothetical creditor under section 70c. Thus, a major error of the 
Freedman case is the failure of the court to distinguish between 
the admitted power of state law to regulate the rights of creditors 
in state proceedings and the lack of power in state law to dictate 
what standard of reference shall be used to determine the rights of 
the trustee in federal bankruptcy proceedings. 
Act 153 was short-lived, however; in 1956 a second amendment 
to the Michigan chattel mortgage recording statute was passed. 
This amendment, Act 233, became effective as of September 1957, 
repealed Act 153, and provided instead "that no purchase money 
mortgage shall be void as against creditors of the mortgagor if 
filed within 14 days from the date of execution of such mort-
gage .... "26 Unlike Act 153, Act 233 applies only to purchase 
money chattel mortgages,27 but as to this type of mortgage the act 
defines the rights of creditors in all proceedings to which Michigan 
23 Johnson v. Star, 287 U.S. 527 (1933). 
24 "The law seems to be well established that the words insolvency and bankruptcy 
are synonymous terms in ordinary usage, meaning, and common understanding." In re 
Perry, (S.D. Mich. 1958) 157 F. Supp. 910 at 915. 
25 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. The power of Congress to regulate bankruptcy is derived 
expressly from U.S. CONST., art I, §8, cl. 4. 
26 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.140 as amended by Act 233, Mich. Public Acts, 1957. 
27 This limitation is probably the result of the policy consideration that purchase 
money chattel mortgages are entitled to the same favorable treatment as are purchase 
money mortgages on realty. 
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law is applicable. Unlike Act 153, Act 233 evidences no intent to 
encroach on the power of Congress to define the rights of the 
trustee in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Of primary interest is the fact that Act 233 adopts the "fixed-
period" statutory device to regulate priority between creditors of 
the mortgagor and the chattel mortgagee. Michigan is in the 
minority group of states in which the courts have construed 
chattel mortgage recording statutes to protect interim general 
creditors.28 This policy of protecting interim general creditors 
conflicts with any attempt of complete avoidance of the problems 
raised by the Constance interpretation of section 70c. To the ex-
tent that a state protects interim general creditors, the trustee 
will be able to take advantage of the Constance interpretation of 
section 70c. Thus, even as to purchase money mortgages, Act 233 
does not completely avoid the effect of the Constance construction 
of section 70c. If a purchase money mortgage is not recorded 
within the 14-day period fixed by the act, the trustee can avoid 
the mortgage by asserting the rights of a hypothetical creditor 
who has extended credit prior to the recording date of the mort-
gage. Act 233 does, however, reach an equitable compromise be-
tween the state's policy of protecting interim general creditors 
and the desirability of avoiding the effects of the Constance in-
terpretation of section 70c, through use of a relation-back device. 
The priority of any purchase money mortgage recorded within 
the 14-day period is related back to the execution date of the 
mortgage. Thus, Act 233 accomplishes three things. First, as to 
recordings not within the 14-day period, the act preserves the 
state policy of protecting interim general creditors. Second, as to 
recordings within the 14-day period the act avoids completely the 
effects of the Constance interpretation of section 70c. And third, 
through use of the "fixed-period" and "relation-back" devices, 
the act gives to the diligent mortgagee a certainty of protection 
not available under the pre-1956 Michigan statute. 
Act 233 raises the broader question of the desirability of pro-
tecting interim general creditors under any circumstances. An in-
herent weakness of recording statutes that protect general credi-
tors is persuasively stated in the case of In re Consorto Constr. 
Co.29 In discussing such statutes the court points out that chattel 
28See note 16 supra for a list of the eleven states whose statutes have been construed 
to protect interim general creditors. 
20 (3d Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 676. 
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mortgagees can easily frustrate the attempt to protect general credi-
tors. If a mortgage is not recorded within the time required by 
state law, the mortgagee can cut off the priority of interim general 
creditors by the simple device of re-executing the "old" mortgage 
and recording this "new" instrument at once.30 Since the "new" 
mortgage is recorded within the time required by state law, it 
creates a lien in favor of the mortgagee that is good against all 
general creditors. Priority rights of the general creditors are then 
determined by reference to the "new" instead of the "old" mort-
gage. To require such re-execution of the old instrument as a 
basis for effective recordation is aptly termed "worthless for-
malism" by the court in the Consorto case.31 Thus, the specter of 
Constance v. Harvey can have beneficial results in those states 
with "Constance-type" statutes. First, it may encourage such states 
to amend their recording statutes to reach a more workable com-
promise between the policy of protecting general creditors and the 
desire to avoid the effects of the Constance construction of section 
70c. And second, such states may be encouraged to consider the 
broader policy question of the desirability of protecting general 
creditors under any circumstances. 
III. Federal Judicial Reaction to Constance v. Harvey 
Federal judicial reaction to the Constance case has been infre-
quent but generally negative. The reaction has been of two types: 
cases which assume without deciding that the Constance rationale 
is sound but then refuse to extend it to new factual situations,32 
and cases which expressly repudiate the Constance interpretation 
of section 70c. With the exception of one case, however, this re-
pudiation has been in the form of mere dictum. 
The Fifth Circuit has recently decided two cases in which it 
refused to extend the Constance doctrine. In General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp v. Saliba,33 it was ruled that a state statute can 
retroactively affect the rights of the trustee as a hypothetical credi-
tor under section 70c. The court held that the trustee's rights un-
ao Apparently no court :has ever held that the "new" mortgage is in substance the 
"old" mortgage, so that the priority of general creditors should therefore be determined 
by reference to the old mortgage. 
81 In re Consorto Constr. Co., (3d Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 676 at 679. 
82 A good example of this type of case is In the Matter of Freedman, (S.D. Mich. 1959) 
168 F. Supp. 25, note 21 supra, discussed at length in part II of this comment. 
83 (5th Cir. 1958) 260 F. (2d) 262. 
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der section 70c are to be determined by reference to state law as 
it existed at the time of bankruptcy, thereby rejecting a possible 
extension of the Constance rationale which would allow the 
trustee to assert the rights of a hypothetical creditor under the 
state law as it existed at the time of the security transaction in 
question.34 In the second Fifth Circuit case, Brookhaven Bank and 
Trust Co. v. Gwin,35 the court assumed that the Constance case 
was good law and that the trustee could have avoided the chattel 
mortgage in question. The contest in this case did not involve the 
trustee but was between the chattel mortgagee and an interim 
lienor, the trustee having relinquished all claim to the chattel. 
In upholding the priority of the interim lienor the court made 
it clear that the Constance rationale works only for the trustee's 
benefit and could not be relied upon by other contestants to 
settle the status of the chattel mortgage.36 Thus, the court again 
declined to extend the Constance rationale by refusing to allow 
persons other than the trustee to benefit derivatively from his 
rights as a hypothetical creditor under section 70c. 
The remaining cases involving section 70c are of varying de-
grees of helpfulness in determining whether there is a judicial 
trend toward repudiation of Constance v. Harvey. Since the 1950 
amendment to section 70c, several federal courts have discussed 
the provision in general terms, but many of these discussions have 
not been directed toward determining the effect of the 1950 
amendment, nor have they referred to the Constance rationale or 
involved cases with factual situations similar to that in the Con-
stance case.37 These cases, therefore, are of little value in apprais-
ing federal judicial reaction to the Constance interpretation of 
section 70c. 
34 " ••• [I]t 1would ·be a distortion of the intent and effect of Sec. 70, sub. c, ••• to 
hold that, under the facts of this case, it enshrines the preferential position ••• of the 
trustee, over the holder of the conditional sales contract beyond the power of the leg• 
islature of Georgia to change it." General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Saliba, (5th Cir. 
1958) 260 F. (2d) 262 at 264. 
35 (5th Cir. 1958) 253 F. (2d) 17. 
36 "As has just been indicated, however, subdivisions (c) and (e) of Section 70 operate 
in favor of the trustee. We have been cited to no case, nor have we found any, holding 
that either of those subdivisions can be used as a basis for determining relative priorities 
ben\l'een nll'o lien holders as against whom the trustee claims no right." Brookhaven 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Gwin, (5th Cir. 1958) 253 F. (2d) 17 at 23. 
37 See In re Valley City Furniture Co., (S.D. Mich. 1958) 161 F. Supp. 39; In re Ripp, 
(7th Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 849; Kerry v. Schneider, (9th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 896; United 
States v. Eiland, (4th Cir. 1%5) 2~3 F. (2d) 118; In re Driscoll, (S.D. Cal. 1954) 127 F. 
Supp. 81; In re Kranz Candy Co., (7th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 588. 
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In other cases the factual situations were such that the Con-
stance construction of section 70c could probably have been ap-
plied to avoid the security transaction involved, but this construc-
tion apparently was not urged and was clearly not referred to in 
any of the decisions.38 It could be argued that these cases repre-
sent an implied repudiation of the Constance rationale, but any 
such conclusion would clearly rest on a weak foundation. 
A third series of cases contains dicta from which a more sub-
stantial implied repudiation of the Constance rationale can be 
drawn. Since none of these cases involved facts similar to the 
Constance case, however, the dicta found in these decisions can at 
best be regarded as mere expressions of judicial dissatisfaction 
with Constance v. Harvey. Typical of this group of cases is McKay 
v. Trusco Finance Co.,89 in which the Fifth Circuit implied that 
if the security transaction involved had been recorded before the 
date of bankruptcy, the trustee could avoid the transaction only 
by asserting the rights of an actual creditor under section 70e(l) 
of the Bankruptcy Act,40 and that the trustee would not be al-
lowed under section 70c to assert the rights of a hypothetical 
creditor who extended credit in the interim. 
In the quite recent case of In the Matter of Billings,41 a 
Missouri federal district court was faced with facts and a state 
statute much like those in the Constance case. The court expressly 
held against the Constance interpretation of section 70c. This case 
involved a purchase money chattel mortgage given by the bank-
rupt to the Borden Company and not recorded until 14 days 
after its execution. Under Missouri law interim general creditors 
can avoid a chattel mortgage which is not recorded within a rea-
sonable time.42 After holding that a 14-day delay was unreason-
able, the referee held that the trustee by using the Constance 
38 See Exchange National Bank of Colorado Springs v. Hough, (10th Cir. 1958) 258 
F. (2d) 785; In re Cotter, (S.D. Mich. 1953) II3 F. Supp. 859, affd. sub nom. Emery v. 
Union Inv. Co., (6th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 183. 
39 (5th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 431 at 435. See also In the Matter of Luckenbill, (E.D. 
Pa. 1957) 156 F. Supp. 129. 
40 52 Stat. 882 (1938), II U.S.C. (1952) §II0e(l). The case of In re American Textile 
Printers Co., (D.C. N.J. 1957) 152 F. Supp. 901, is cited in 4 MOORE, COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, 14th ed., §70.51, p. 100 (Supp. 1958), as holding contrary to the Constance case. 
T.he Textile case, however, did not involve a Constance problem because the applicable 
state statute protected only lien creditors and not general creditors. 
41 (W .D. Mo. 1959) 170 F. Supp. 253. 
42 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §443.460. The Missouri statute is construed in connection 
with §70e(l) in the case of In re Alton Milk Co., (W.D. Mo. 1957) 157 F. Supp. 23. 
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construction of section 70c could avoid the chattel mortgage, it 
being unnecessary to prove that actual creditors had extended 
credit in the interim. The district court, assuming also that a 14-
day delay was unreasonable under Missouri law, reversed the de-
cision of the referee on the grounds that Constance v. Haroey 
was an incorrect interpretation of section 70c. In reaching its 
decision the court stated that the trustee could not assert the 
rights of a hypothetical creditor who extended credit in the in-
terim because no actual creditors had extended credit in the in-
terim.48 Throughout its discussion of the trustee's rights under 
section 70c the court stressed the fact that no rights of actual 
creditors had intervened between the execution date of the chattel 
mortgage and the date of its recording. 
Although the result of the Billings case is sound, it appears 
that the underlying reasoning is perhaps incorrect. To say that 
no hypothetical creditor on the date of bankruptcy could avoid 
the chattel mortgage because no rights of actual creditors inter-
vened in the interim is to say that the trustee's rights under section 
70c are derivative rights, dependent on the existence of actual 
creditors. This is clearly contrary to the language of the statute.44 
The strongest argument against the Constance interpretation does 
not make the trustee's rights under section 70c tum upon the 
existence or non-existence of actual creditors. It is instead based on 
the proposition that any rights accruing to the trustee under sec-
tion 70c must be rights which accrue at the date of bankruptcy and 
not at some prior hypothetical time. With reference to the time 
when the trustee's rights as a lien creditor accrue, this proposition 
is not open to question.45 The result should be the same with 
reference to the trustee's rights as a general creditor under sec-
tion 70c.46 When a debtor-creditor relationship is established im-
48 " ••• There was no 'perfect' or 'ideal' hypothetical creditor on the day of bank-
ruptcy, because no rights had intervened between the time of the execution of the chattel 
mortgage and the date of its filing, and could not therefore, on the day of bankruptcy, 
have asserted any right to the property." In the -Matter of Billings, (W.D. Mo. 1959) 170 
F. Supp. 253 at 258. 
44 Section 70c expressly states that the trustee can assert the rights of a hypothetical 
creditor "whether or not sucb a creditor actually exists." 66 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. 
' (1952) §ll0c. 
45 Section 70c expressly states that the lien of the hypothetical creditor arises "at the 
date of bankruptcy." 66 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. (1952) §ll0c. See also Bailey v. Baker 
lee Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268 (1915). 
46 See Weintraub, Levin, and Beldock, "The Strong-Arm Clause Strikes the Belated 
Chattel Mortgage," 25 FoRD. L. tREv. 261 at 265, 269, · 270-271 (1956). The writers stress 
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portant legal rights accrue to the creditor, rights which in many 
cases dep.end upon the time that credit was extended.47 The trustee 
under section 70c should not be allowed to assert the rights of a 
hypothetical general creditor when the rights asserted depend 
upon the creation, prior to the date of bankruptcy, of a hypo-
thetical debtor-creditor relationship. 
It is not the absence of actual creditors in the hypothetical 
class which makes the Constance construction of section 70c un-
sound. Rather, it is unsound because it unreasonably denies pro-
tection to security transactions perfected prior to the date of bank-
ruptcy. If the trustee under section 70c is regarded as a hypotheti-
cal creditor who extended credit at the date of bankruptcy, a 
proper balance would be struck between the competing policies 
of equality of distribution and the preservation of fairly acquired 
security interests. 
IV. Conclusion 
State legislatures can profitably use the Constance case as a 
springboard for reviewing the policy which underlies their re-
spective recording statutes dealing with chattel security transac-
tions. State legislation should be framed so as not to encroach upon 
the congressional power to establish the standard of reference used 
to define the trustee's powers under section 70c. If a state wishes 
both to preserve its policy of protecting general creditors and to 
avoid the harsh results of the Constance interpretation of section 
70c, constructive legislation is possible. The state can utilize the 
fixed-period device which allows the holder of a security interest, 
by perfecting the security transaction within the fixed period, to 
relate his priority back to the execution date of the transaction 
involved. 
Federal judicial reaction to Constance v. Harvey appears to 
establish a trend toward repudiation of the Constance interpreta-
tion of section 70c. While this reaction is sound, the federal courts 
should carefully weigh the reasons they give for this repudiation. 
The most persuasive reason is not one which makes rejection of 
the fact that §70c historically was intended to confer rights on the trustee only at the 
date of ,bankruptcy and not at some prior hypothetical time. 
47 An example of such rights are those of priority. The numerous state statutes which 
make the creditor's priority tum upon his status as a prior, interim, or subsequent general 
creditor show the importance attached to the time that the debtor-creditor relationship 
arose. 
1240 MICHIGAN LA.w REVIEW [ Vol. 57 
the Constance rationale turn upon the existence or non-existence 
of actual creditors. Rather, rejection should be based on the policy 
consideration that section 70c was not intended to permit the trus-
tee to assert the rights of a hypothetical creditor accruing prior to 
the date of bankruptcy. Much confusion would be removed from 
this area by a congressional amendment to section 70c stating ex-
pressly that the hypothetical creditor referred to is a creditor ex-
tending credit at the date of bankruptcy. Until such an amend-
ment, however, the Constance case should continue to have a 
catalystic effect in those states with "Constance-type" statutes. 
This effect may nevertheless be beneficial if it produces construc-
tive reappraisal of state statutes and careful analysis by the federal 
courts of the trustee's powers under section 70c. 
George Sidney Buchanan, Jr., S.Ed. 
